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The Arctic Ocean’s physical environments and ecosystems are some of the most fragile and least well understood on Earth. 
They are characterised by extreme light and dark cycles, shortened food chains, and slow ecosystem recovery from disturbance. 
The Arctic seabed also holds promise of lucrative oil and gas resources, whose future exploitation could have substantial 
environmental impacts. Arctic jurisdictions must weigh environmental conservation and global agreements to reduce carbon 
emissions against the social implications and potential economic gain of offshore oil and gas projects in the Arctic, and must do 
so in the face of substantial scientific uncertainty around the impacts of climate and environmental change in the Arctic. We 
know, however, that major projects such as oil and gas projects have the potential to lead to transboundary environmental 
harm. We have some understanding of how any pollution may be carried by sea ice or on the ocean currents which flow around 
the Arctic Ocean. Even so, we have little understanding of how such pollutants might affect the Arctic ecosystem. Substantial 
gaps remain in scientific understanding of Arctic ecosystem functioning, particularly as it changes rapidly with the advent of 
climate change. These gaps in scientific understanding raise legal questions about how, for example, the law’s obligation not to 
cause significant transboundary environmental harm applies in the Arctic. In particular one may ask what actions are required 
by a state to show that they have acted with due diligence. Is it sufficient, for example, to show that they have complied with 
existing international treaties?   
This paper draws out key legal and scientific issues on which greater understanding is required. In essence it presents a roadmap 
for further research and negotiation. 
 
Introduction 
Some of the largest remaining petroleum reserves worldwide are located in the Arctic. Since 
exploratory drilling began in the 1970’s there has been consistent interest in exploiting these 
resources (AMAP, 2007), although to date few fields have entered into production, owing to: low 
oil prices; the technological and logistical challenges of operating in extremely cold and remote 
environments; national commitments to climate agreements; and the risk of environmental impact 
that could result from a large oil spill or other serious event (Gulas et al., 2017). Even so, Norway 
has been active in offshore petroleum exploration in the Arctic since the Snøhvit field was 
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discovered in 1984 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018) and there is potential for further 
activity.   
Should offshore oil and gas activity increase in the Arctic, so does the risk of harm to the marine 
environment. AMAP (2010) highlighted a number of key risks to the Arctic environment 
associated with oil and gas extraction, including: spills of hydrocarbons and other pollutants from 
offshore drilling activities, blowouts, rig accidents and shipping disasters; operational pollution 
from exploratory drilling; increasing volumes of rubbish and sewage; an influx of people to the 
Arctic; increased air pollution; noise pollution to the marine environment; increased emissions 
from burning fossil fuels; light pollution; and cumulative impacts stemming from multiple 
installations and human activities. Of these, this paper will focus on certain impacts directly 
associated with offshore oil and gas development: hydrocarbon spills, pollutants, underwater noise 
pollution, and the impact of cumulative development. While the remaining effects are important, 
they are also associated with wider human activity in the Arctic (mining, tourism, shipping, etc.) 
and so draw in broader considerations we do not have space to address here.  
The Arctic Ocean itself is a remote and challenging environment, but also one which is inherently 
vulnerable to environmental change, and about which we know very little. Of the eight Arctic 
nations, five have exclusive economic zones within the Arctic circle (Canada, USA, Russia, 
Denmark, Norway). For the purposes of this paper, we consider ‘the Arctic’ to be the region 
defined by the Arctic Circle. More specifically, this includes the Arctic Ocean, as defined by the 
ocean north of the latitude 66˚34’, and the states whose coastlines border it. This definition is 
environmentally relevant, as it includes not only areas of sea ice cover, but also the ‘subarctic 
marine’ regions between Norway and Greenland, through which most of the water entering and 
exiting the Arctic Ocean flows (Jones, 2001). This boundary is also politically relevant: the five 
aforementioned states have indicated their intention to collaborate, as communicated in the 
Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, and as illustrated in more recent agreements such as the 2017 
moratorium on fisheries activity in the central Arctic Ocean. 
Although separate in legal terms, the territorial waters of each nation bordering the Arctic are 
linked by ocean circulation, sea ice drift, and species migration, all of which can transport resources 
and impacts such as pollutants between them. It is an inherently connected environment. These 
characteristics mean that, for example, the risk of harm being caused to other states or to the 
environment beyond national jurisdiction may be higher in the Arctic than elsewhere even where 
pollution would normally be regarded as small scale.  Similarly, recent advances in oceanography 
suggest that in some cases (e.g. pollutant spills in ice, Blanken et al., 2017) it may be possible to 
demonstrate causation linking operational pollution to significant transboundary harm.   
Thus we highlight key legal and scientific questions that are linked to the specific impacts noted 
above and draw out how these impacts and the legal and scientific questions attached to them may 
differ in the Arctic to other oceans.  The main discussion is focused upon what may be termed 
“flaws” in the legal framework and draws out the legal and scientific questions that need 
addressing.  It thus sets an agenda for research in relation to offshore installations in the Arctic. 
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Flaws in the Framework and New Questions 
The Potential for Significant Transboundary Harm 
Coastal states have sovereignty over their terrirorial waters and sovereign rights to the hydrocarbon 
and mineral desposits in their continental shelf and to exploit renewable energy in their exclusive 
economic zones (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), Articles 2, 56 and 77). 
These rights underpin the exploitation of oil, gas and renewable energy sources in the oceans. 
While the rights give states considerable freedom to exploit resources, they do bring with them 
obligations. These obligations largely reiterate and expand upon customary international law 
obligations to protect and prevent harm to the marine environment, (Article 192) to prevent 
transboundary harm (Article 194(2)) and to harmonize their measures to prevent and reduce 
marine environmental harm (Article 194(1)). In addition, specific obligations to control pollution 
from offshore installations and to enforce those obligations are found in Articles 208, 210, 215 
and  216. Obligations to control pollution from shipping found in Articles 211 and 217 to 221 are 
also relevant where ships are used to service and support offshore energy activities.  
To meet these obligations in the context of potential transboundary harm states must apply the 
prevention principle (Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(ICJ 1996)).  The prevention principle requires states to prevent “significant” transboundary harm 
and to do so by acting with due diligence. The problem with these obligations in the context of 
potential oil and gas activities in the Arctic is that what is meant by “significant” is not clear, nor 
is it clear what acting with due diligence requires.   
What is regarded as significant has to be decided in the context of the particular issue. We know 
that “significant” means more than simply the harm is detectable, and that it need not require the 
harm to be substantial in nature. But in the context of the Arctic Ocean, where a relatively minor 
oil spill may linger longer than in temperate waters (Leahy & Colwell, 1990; Atlas et al., 1978), 
causing lasting damage to the environment, we have yet to fully understand what scale of pollution 
would count as significant. Would, for example, operational pollution which may accumulate 
across time amount to significant pollution? Some authors have suggested that incremental 
accumulation of impacts may not be captured by the term “significant harm” and so would not 
give rise to potential liability (Duvic-Paoli & Viñuales, 2015). Yet in the context of the Arctic a 
failure to address operational pollution could have significant (but unforeseen) impacts. 
Although there is a substantial amount of information available on the environmental effects of 
hydrocarbons in the marine environment, relatively few impact studies have been carried out on 
truly Arctic species (but see Rice et al., 1978). Instead, the majority of research investigating the 
impacts of oil spills on marine species have focused on temperate waters. It is therefore difficult 
to predict how well these findings might be applied to the Arctic environment (AMAP, 2010) and 
while, for example, the Arctic Council takes a leading role in promoting the development of 
scientific understanding on these and other Arctic issues, significant gaps in understanding remain. 
With this in mind, existing international agreements on pollution and the marine environment (e.g. 
UNCLOS, OSPAR convention) may not fully encapsulate what is truly required to protect the 
Arctic Ocean.  
The recovery rate of the Arctic marine environment in response to disturbance is likely to be slow, 
whether as a result of reduced species diversity, the slow-growing nature of many cold-water 
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species, or the reproductive importance of the region for many species, for example nesting 
seabirds (Forsgren et al. 2009). Combined with the fact that Arctic food chains are comparatively 
short and dependent on key species (Kaiser et al., 2011), pollution, even comparatively low level 
operational pollution, could have severe impacts on the functioning of the Arctic ocean ecosystem.  
In addition, a number of factors could exacerbate the severity of an Arctic oil spill. At colder 
temperatures, for example, the density and viscosity of oil increases, while its degradation time is 
much slower (Leahy & Colwell, 1990; Atlas, 1981; Atlas et al. 1978). This means that spilled oil 
may linger on the seabed, under ice, or in coastal environments for longer than it otherwise would 
in temperate or tropical environments. In the case of the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska, oil is 
still detectable in the intertidal environment. It has been suggested that oil trapped in sediment 
following the 1970 Arrow spill in Chedabucto Bay, Nova Scotia, Canada, could persist for as long 
as 150 years (Vandermeulen & Gordon, 1976). Each of these spills was, however, relatively 
contained in that the spill came from an oil tanker holding a relatively small volume of oil 
compared to what might emerge from a major spill at an offshore oil development. The risks of 
oil, or other chemicals, lingering in the Arctic environment as a result of an offshore accident 
attached to oil and gas activites are, therefore, significant.  
In addition, in considering the impact of pollution in the Arctic we must consider the pollutant/ice 
interface and its impact on the marine ecosystem. The Arctic Ocean ecosystem is dominated by 
the seasonal fluctuation of sea ice. Sea ice is an important habitat for photosynthetic algae and sub-
ice phytoplankton, the primary producers that form the basis of the Arctic marine food web (Post 
et al, 2013). Each year as the seasonal sea ice thins, increasing light penetration causes these primary 
producers to rapidly increase in numbers, in turn fueling the seasonal reproduction and growth of 
zooplankton such as copepods (Darnis et al., 2012, Gosselin et al., 1997), which serve as prey to 
higher order consumers including fish and crustaceans. While sea ice algae and sub ice 
phytoplankton are major contributors to biomass in polar seas, sea ice is also a critical habitat for 
many charismatic species such as polar bears, walruses, narwhals, and many species of seabirds, 
who depend on sea ice for reproduction, food, or migration (Hoegh-Gulberg & Bruno, 2010).  
Thus any impact on zooplankton as a result of pollution has a significant impact on the food chain.  
Pollutants such as oil may remain on the surface of the sea ice as it forms, or pool beneath it (Payne 
et al., 1990). Alternatively, sub-ice oil may also move upwards through the ice via brine channels 
(Petrich et al., 2013) and fissures in the ice, to ultimately appear on the sea ice surface (Lee et al., 
2015). In so doing the oil or other pollutant may diminish light penetration or make the sub-ice 
areas no longer habitable.  The short food chains and dependence of those food chains on ice may 
open the marine Arctic to more vulnerability to pollutants than would be the case in other ocean 
areas.  Add to this the fact that 75% of sea ice volume has been lost since the 1980s (Schweiger et 
al. 2011, Overland and Want, 2013) and any further diminution of habitable ice area due to (even 
relatively low scale) pollution may have a severe impact on the Arctic marine ecosystem.  
Clearly we are still to understand the extent of these potential impacts, but at the same time these 
potential impacts raise the possibility that states conducting or permitting offshore operations may 
be more likely to find themselves in breach of the obligation not to cause significant transboundary 
harm as a result of activities in the Arctic when similar activities elsewhere would not be predicted 
to cause significant transboundary harm.  
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There is a further aspect to this in that scientific evidence points to the possibility that the 
likelihood of transboundary impacts arising may also be greater in the Arctic than in other oceans 
because of the relationship (or potential relationship) between pollutants and ice. As we noted 
above, where released pollutants (e.g., oil, chemicals) interact with sea ice, they may become 
entrained within the ice in a number of ways, for example in association with the underside of the 
ice, transportation from the underside to the surface of the ice through brine channels or leads, or 
direct integration into sea ice formation (AMAP, 1998). Once a pollutant becomes ice-associated, 
it will often move with the ice as it is transported or dispersed by prevailing winds and currents 
(Afenyo et al., 2016; Beegle-Krause et al., 2013). It may then travel hundreds of kilometres as the 
ice moves, before it is released in another location (possibly another state’s EEZ) as ice melts. For 
example, a recent study investigated the spreading trajectories of ‘worst case scenario’ oil spills in 
the Arctic, and found that the movement of sea ice had the potential to transport oil greater 
distances than ocean currents, sometimes over 4000 km, and that contamination from oil spills 
was in many cases likely to cross international boundaries (Blanken et al., 2017).   
Again this raises both legal and scientific questions. Not only does it suggest that transboundary 
impacts may be more likely, but the relationship between pollutants and ice raises the possibility 
that causation will be easier to establish. In other words, it is possible that it will be easier to trace 
the flow of ice in the Arctic Ocean back to the state of origin of the pollution and this possibility 
may be enhanced by the relative paucity of development in the Arctic. Naturally these legal issues 
point to scientific questions that should be addressed – how do pollutants interact with ice? How 
far will such pollutants be transported? How easy is it to trace the pollutant back to source as a 
result of the pollutant/ice relationship? 
States can mount a defense to any claim that they have failed to act with due diligence by showing, 
in effect, that they have acted reasonably. Due diligence, for example, requires that states take 
reasonable steps to avoid causing transboundary harm. The question of what is reasonable will be 
interpreted in light of any relevant international obligations and of the circumstances in which 
actions take place. Thus a state must show that it has acted in compliance with relevant 
international treaties or guidelines. Key obligations in this respect are those found in Articles 192 
and 194 of UNCLOS which, as discussed above, oblige states to take action to protect and  prevent 
harm to the marine environment and not to permit activities within their jurisdiction which will 
cause transboundary pollution. Other relevant agreements include global treaties, such as the 
London Dumping Convention 1972 and its 1996 Protocol which regulate dumping at sea 
(encompassing disposal of offshore installations at sea); regional treaties such as the OSPAR 
Convention 1992, Annex III of which in effect requires authorising states to regulate pollution 
from offshore installations and soft law instruments such as the Code for the Construction and 
Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (IMO Resolution A.1023(26), 2 December 2009) 
which regulates the design of offshore drilling units to minimize the risk of harm to them or to 
those working on them. There is also a range of oil-based international treaties that apply to all 
areas, including the Arctic. These include the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) which requires, for example, operators to have 
an oil pollution emergency plan in place (Article 4) and states to have effective national pollution 
incident response systems in place (Article 6). The OPRC applies to any fixed or floating offshore 
structure engaged in gas or oil exploration, exploitation or production activities and so is highly 
relevant.  
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Compliance with these obligations is, in terms of due diligence, assessed in light of the 
circumstances. These may include factors such as the level of industrial development of the state 
and its geography. Thus, for example, a densely populated, territorially small state may be expected 
to have a very good awareness of the occurance of any oil spills on their land territory, whereas a 
more sparsly populated state with a large amount of land territory could not be expected to have 
such immediate knowledge. Such distinctions may of course diminish as remote sensing 
technology develops. In the Arctic context, however, what is key is that the environment is harsh 
and so responding to incidents may prove difficult. What might start as a minor (and in another 
location containable) spill, for example, could become a major incident before states are able to 
effectively respond. Crucially, none of the treaties or guidelines referred to above were developed 
for the Arctic specific environment and so a question arises as to whether states complying with 
these treaties, but still causing significant harm to the Arctic marine environment could be said to 
be exercising due diligence.  In other words, do the specific environmental circumstances of the 
Arctic require the coastal states to behave at a higher standard than is required under the global 
treaties? The responses of some Arctic states suggest that may be the case.   
A key response has been the adoption of some polar specific agreements and guidelines, notably 
those adopted under the auspices of or by the Arctic Council. These include the Arctic Council’s 
Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines 2009 (Arctic Guidelines) and the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Guidelines: Systems Safety Management and Safety Culture 2014. The Arctic Guidelines call, for 
example, for the application of the precautionary approach to oil and gas activities and set out 
guidance on the conduct of environmental impact assessments, monitoring, waste management 
and more. While at first glance the Guidelines appear comprehensive they do contain gaps. The 
precautionary approach is, for example, to be applied in accordance with the state’s capabilities 
and how this caveat is to be interpreted is not made clear.  
Potentially binding international law for responding to Arctic oil spills has also been adopted in 
the form of the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response 
in the Arctic (ACMOPPRA). However, although the Arctic states have signed this treaty, they 
have not completed all the steps necessary to bring it into force. A second agreement is the 2011 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, which 
came into force in January 2013. However, this Agreement focuses on protecting individuals at 
risk through accidents at sea in the Arctic, not on protecting the environment. These Arctic 
agreements are supported by the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar 
Code), which contains various technical requirements designed to ensure the safety of ships (and 
those working on them) in polar regions.   
While these agreements do go a long way to responding to oil spills, in our view compliance with 
them may not be sufficient to show that the state has acted with due diligence, nor may it be 
enough to prevent harm to the Arctic. This is largely because of the scientific information on 
which they are based.  As we have shown above, significant questions about the impact of and 
transportation of pollutants remain. As we will show shortly, questions about the ability of the 
environment to recover from any pollution damage also arise. In addition, there is evidence of 
some Arctic states adopting further national Arctic specific measures so suggesting that higher 
standards yet may be required. For example, the US has adopted the binding Arctic Drilling Rules, 
which expressly cover exploratory drilling by mobile offshore drilling units and require a higher 
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standard for drilling in the US Arctic than other areas of the US Outer Continental Shelf. The 
types of measures covered by the Arctic Drilling Rules include that operators are required to use 
equipment which can perform safely in locations that have limited infrastructrure and in extreme 
weather and ocean conditions. They are also required have the ability to track and respond to 
changing ice conditions and adverse weather. Of perhaps greater import in determining the nature 
of actions required in the Arctic was the adoption in the December 2016 of the United States-
Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement through which Canada instituted an indefinite moratorium 
on all future oil and gas activities in all Canadian Arctic waters and the USA adopted an indefinite 
moratorium on all future oil and gas activities in much of its Arctic waters. (Both moratoria are, 
however, due to be reviewed after 5 years and the US moratorium may be reversed by the current 
President, Donald Trump). 
There is a further element to demonstrating that a state is acting with due diligence: certain  
procedural obligations must be complied with. 
Procedural Obligations: EIA, and Notification and Consultation 
States are subject to the well-recognised obligation to notify and consult potentially affected states 
of a planned activity which may lead to significant harmful impacts on them (Lac Lannoux 
Arbitration, 1957). The obligation to notify and consult with states potentially harmed by an 
activity leads to the obligation to undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The EIA 
obligation applies where a state is considering authorising a project or activity that may have a 
significant adverse transboundary impact, in particular on a shared resource (Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (ICJ 2010)), but also in areas beyond state jurisdiction (Advisory Opinion on 
Responsibility and Obligations of States with respect to Activities in the Area (ITLOS 2011)). The 
obligation is also found in a number of treaties, most notably the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982,1 requires EIAs to be conducted “When States have reasonable grounds 
for believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial 
pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment” (Article 206). 
Guidance on how to conduct EIAs can be found in a number of guidelines including the 2009 
Arctic Guidelines and the Convention on Biological Diversity, Voluntary Guidelines on 
Biodiversity-Inclusive Impact Assessment. 
The objective of an EIA is to provide decision makers with information on the environmental 
consequences of proposed activities; enable such information to influence decisions and provide 
a mechanism for public/stakeholder participation. It must therefore take place before the activity 
or project begins and, as the Court noted in the Pulp Mills case, it places an ongoing obligation to 
monitor impacts from these same activities on states.   
EIA’s rely on the existence of or establishment of scientific data on the environmental baseline 
associated with a particular time-frame and spatial scale. This allows for natural variability to be 
accounted for within the assessment, and ensures that the spatial extent of the baseline matches 
the extent of potential effects for the impact being investigated (Wassmann et al., 2011). While the 
Arctic Council leads in the establishment of baseline information through, for example, its periodic 
Arctic Ocean review projects, a lack of ecological information in the Arctic and the impact of 
global climate change remains. This makes it challenging to set sufficiently concrete environmental 
baselines for comparison across the timescale of resource extraction within, for example, a project 
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with a potential life of 25-40 years. Despite detailed international guidelines being available (in, for 
example, the Arctic Guidelines and the CBD Guidelines), they do not provide sufficient detail to 
address this. 
For example, a project developer might record environmental parameters over five years prior to 
an installation in order to set a ‘no impact’ baseline for that installation. From the point when 
installation commences, the pre-installation measurements are used as a frame against which to 
measure any impacts from the development. However, the background environmental change in 
the Arctic is so rapid that attributing a change to the project may be problematic. Thus, 
environmental change within an impacted site could be attributed to that impact, or to ongoing 
(background) environmental change resulting from climate change and other persistent stressors, 
or a combination of the two. The current international regime on EIA provides little assistance on 
how to tackle this issue. For example, the Arctic Guidelines provide “monitoring should preferably 
be conducted so as to distinguish impacts due to oil and gas activities from other relevant sources” 
(Arctic Guidelines: 21) but although they also call for natural and other hazards to be taken into 
account in an EIA they, like other legal documents, cannot or rather do not identify how to address 
the scientific uncertainties that come with, for example, rapid climate change. In scientific terms 
this leads to the conclusion that further, extensive and ongoing environmental monitoring in the 
Arctic is required at both development sites and those free of development. In legal terms this also 
raises questions of causation.  Without robust scientific evidence based on pan-Arctic monitoring, 
states permitting offshore activities may find themselves open to claims of transboundary 
environmental harm, imputed to the offshore activity but actually caused by activities elsewhere.   
To some extent the need for further research to establish environmental baselines is being met by 
states acting individually and collectively, in particular through the Arctic Council, to develop 
understanding of the State of the Arctic Environment. Key reports such as those produced 
through the Arctic Council Working Groups on Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) 
and Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) draw together best scientific 
understanding. We suggest, however, that further support for the research undertaken by the 
Arctic Council and others is needed. 
To some extent the need to establish baseline information can also be addressed (at least in part) 
by paying attention to another element of the EIA obligation. The obligation also requires that 
indigenous peoples be given an opportunity to input into the EIA process (Johnstone, 2014: 168). 
All EIA processes provide for public participation in some form. The fact that many Indigenous 
communities rely on Arctic marine resources means that they meet any tests to be counted as 
public. In the Arctic context this is highly significant as the Indigenous communities will often 
have a far more sophisticated understanding of the part of the Arctic marine ecosystem they 
interact with than “traditional” science. At the same time, those conducting the EIA may lack the 
linguistic skills and cultural understanding to ensure that Indigenous knowledge does feed into the 
EIA process in an effective manner. Again, the Arctic Council can and does play a role in 
supporting Indigenous peoples as they feed into the reports produced by its Working Groups and 
these reports in turn may be of use in informing the EIA process, but this is only part of the story.  
Further input into EIAs conducted at the national level is also required. Thus legal and scientific 
questions of how to effectively involve Indigenous and local communities in EIA and other data 
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gathering processes arise. What procedures are required, for example, to ensure that the 
Indigenous voice is heard and understood in the EIA process?  
The next step will be then to evaluate the impact of environmental stressors resulting from a 
development. In the Arctic, however, calculating both the potential impact of an event and the 
relative costs of prevention or mitigation will prove scientifically challenging. For example, 
experience from previous oil spills suggests that predicting the long-term impacts of spills is 
associated with high uncertainty of outcomes (Lee et al., 2015). Risk assessments and predicting 
impact outcomes is even more taxing in the Arctic, as the rapidly changing environment with the 
advent of climate change adds an additional dimension of complexity (Duarte et al., 2012). In part 
this is because there has been limited opportunity to test cleanup methods in the Arctic, but the 
complex dynamics of oil/chemical sea ice interactions make it particularly difficult to track the 
spread of a spill and to predict where it will be transported and how it may begin to degrade. 
Uncertainty in this area makes it hard for those assessing risks posed by Arctic pollution to predict 
both the severity of pollution associated with any particular activity, and to plan effective 
containment and clean up strategies to mitigate environmental harm. 
In addition, in the Arctic the EIA process also raises questions in relation to cumulative impacts.  
Arguably states are required by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and other international 
agreements, to take account of cumulative impacts in marine EIAs (Oude Elferink, 2012). For 
example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Voluntary Guidelines on  EIA, which 
provide guidance on how to interpret and apply Article 14  of the CBD note that the assessment 
process should include evaluation of (potential) cumulative impacts. The real challenge is, 
however, in identifying, or assessing the actual impact of potential cumulative impacts in the 
Arctic. For example, the noise from one individual vessel travelling to and from offshore 
production facilities may be short-lived and localised, but the transit of multiple vessels along the 
same route may displace animal populations, or cause migrating animals to avoid the area and to 
experience increased metabolic costs in order to swim around the affected area (Moore et al., 2012 
and references therein). These types of impacts may be felt in any ocean in which they take place, 
however, in the Arctic their impact may be compounded by the impacts of rapid climate change 
also affecting Arctic marine species and habitat.  
The substantial gaps in our baseline understanding of the Arctic Ocean are amplified by the fact 
that it is difficult to project how the ecosystem will change in the future. This suggests that 
predicting how the cumulative impacts of oil and gas developments in the Arctic are distinct from 
wider environmental change presents a significant challenge, not only to the environmental 
scientists carrying out the assessments, but also to policy- and law-makers who must develop 
adequate instruments to regulate these developments within a context of substantial environmental 
uncertainty. Must, for example, EIAs be conducted for all Arctic marine projects regardless of size 
because of the potential for significant harm as a result of cumulative impacts?  How do we address 
the fact that cumulative impacts could be exacerbated by the interaction of, for example, chemical 
or oil pollution and ice? If it is possible that operational oil spills are “captured” by the ice, 
transported hundreds of miles and “deposited” in another state’s EEZ in a single ice melt event, 
what liability might the emitting state have and what redress would be open to the receiving state? 
The possibilities these questions raise also lead one to ask if there might be a case for an Arctic 
wide strategic environmental impact assessment (SEA) to help identify potential cumulative 
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impacts. As an Arctic wide SEA it would, in line with the definition of the Arctic Ocean we use in 
this paper, cover the ocean north of the latitude 66˚34’, a wider area than the regional SEAs 
recommended in the Arctic Guidelines and the national SEAs recommended by the CBD 
Voluntary Guidelines. Adopting one might also fit with the recommendations of the Arctic 
Council Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation which include “extending cooperation 
throughout the entire cycle of marine stewardship: from the planning of scientific research, to … 
implementation of policy and, to monitoring and assessment of the policy’s effectiveness” (Arctic 
Council, 2017: 4-5). 
The challenges of conducting an “effective” EIA we have outlined point to the need for very full 
notification and consultation procedures with neighbouring states if a state sponsoring a 
development is to ensure that it can demonstrate that it has acted with due diligence to prevent 
transboundary environmental harm.  As we suggested above, they also point, not just to the need 
for further scientific research, but to the potential benefits of an Arctic-wide Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) to determine where activities could or should not be permitted. 
The need for an SEA is also emphasized by the problems associated with clean up and recovery 
from spills and cumulative impacts in the Arctic. 
Redress, Clean-Up and Recovery  
The final set of issues to consider in the context of transboundary pollution is the question of 
redress if one state suffers harm as a result of transboundary pollution.  Again, as we demonstrate 
the costs of and indeed possibility of clean up and recovery from pollution incidents or cumulative 
pollution may be very different in the Arctic than in other oceans and a series of legal and scientific 
questions arise.   
As we have discussed, in comparison with other marine ecosystems, relatively little is known about 
the Arctic marine ecosystem. What we do know is that there is consensus within the research 
community that Arctic species are likely to recover more slowly than temperate species following 
disturbance because many are long lived and reproduce slowly, are more susceptible to toxins than 
their temperate counterparts, and because of increased toxicity of pollutants in cold waters. 
Regardless, the magnitude of this effect is unclear (Rice et al. 1978; Suchanek, 1993).  
Ecosystem recovery rates following disturbance events may also be slower in the Arctic than in 
other marine environments. The Arctic has historically been a relatively pristine environment; 
individual and population recovery rates have only been investigated for a handful of species. 
However, it is expected that colder temperatures, reduced light levels during the winter months, a 
truncated growing season, and low nutrient availability may all reduce the recovery rates of species 
in the Arctic Ocean, extending the temporal footprint of an impact. Furthermore, biodegredation 
rates for pollutants in the Arctic Ocean are also likely to be slower relative to other marine 
environments, suggesting that contaminants such as spilled oil will persist in the environment for 
long periods of time, particularly in Arctic sea ice (Leahy & Colwell, 1990; Atlas, 1981; Atlas et al. 
1978). 
This scientific uncertainty raises a number of legal issues. Given the untested nature of cleanup 
and restoration methods in the Arctic, restitution in kind may not be possible. Equally, however, 
presenting a robust claim for compensation may prove problematic, particularly given the ruling 
by the International Court of Justice in the Costa Rica v Nicaragua case in early 2018. There the 
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court was particularly critical of Costa Rica’s methodology for calculating its claim for 
compensation. It would seem then that any uncertainty in costings might undermine a potential 
claim for harm arising from transboundary pollution.  
A potential solution might be to expand the application of, or adopt measures similar to those 
found in the Fund Convention which is financed through contributions from importers and 
exporters of oil. In this case operators or importers/exporters might contribute to  a fund to 
address clean up operations resulting from pollution from offshore installations in the Arctic. An 
alternative would be to follow the model used in the Antarctic Treaty Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty under which a fund is maintained to reimburse the reasonable 
costs of parties to the treaty in responding to environmental emergencies where the emergency 
was not caused by actions over where they have jurisdiction (Article 12 of Annex VI to the 
Protocol). In this case the contributions to the fund are from operators which have failed to take 
remedial action and where the State Party authorising them has failed to take remedial action 
(Article 6 of Annex VI to the Protocol.)  The danger in following the Antarctic approach is, 
however, that the operators may dissolve or go bankrupt following an emergency and before 
arrangements are made for them to pay into any fund. To some degree this risk is mitigated by the 
liability under Article 6 being joint and severally owed by all operators on a project, nevertheless, 
there is a clear need to examine the most appropriate ways forward. 
International Obligations: Cooperation and the Precautionary Approach 
International Law has long recognised the obligation to cooperate. It is contained in many treaties, 
including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity 1992 and it operates at the regional level as well as between neighbouring states. States’ 
willingness to embrace the obligation to cooperate, particularly at the regional level, is seen in the 
number of regional seas treaties and programmes around the globe. The UN Environment 
Programme lists 18 regional seas, including the Arctic, and the Arctic states themselves have 
recognised the need for further cooperation in the form of an Arctic Regional Programme (Arctic 
Council, 2017). The application of the obligation to cooperate in the context of marine pollution 
was also recognised in the Mox Plant Case (MOX Plant, ITLOS (2001)) and reiterated in the Land 
Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor Case (ITLOS (2003) and its application in the 
management of marine resources established in the Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted 
by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission to ITLOS in 2015 (Advisory Opinion by Fisheries 
Commission (ITLOS (2015)).  
As discussed above, the Arctic states have been proactive in cooperating to address pollution from 
oil and gas activities. The question that arises, however, is: does the obligation to cooperate require 
states to act when the potential impacts of an activity are still uncertain? We know from past 
experience that scientific uncertainty may be used as a reason not to enter into new agreements 
and that even where the scientific community agrees on its knowledge and understanding, political 
and economic considerations hold more weight in the development of further agreements (Kirk, 
2011). Yet in the face of uncertainty, the Arctic states have already accepted the obligation to 
cooperate and, as indicated earlier, have entered into treaties and adopted guidelines to address 
some (potential) harms in the Arctic and cooperated in relation to the production and collection 
of scientific data through, in particular, the Arctic Council. They also adopted the 2017 Agreement 
on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. This agreement will, hopefully, go some 
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way to help address the gaps in scientific understanding of the marine Arctic. Even so, legal 
questions arise as to how far the obligation to cooperate requires the Arctic states to work together.  
Does, for example, the significant risk of harm to the environment coupled with the significant 
degree of uncertainty around the nature of any impact from oil and gas activities mean that the 
adoption of a precautionary approach to oil and gas activities is legally or scientifically necessary?  
Under the precautionary approach activities presumed to be harmful are not permitted unless they 
are known not to cause (significant) harm or unless measures have been, or will be taken to prevent 
harm to the environment. Given the challenges the precautionary approach presents to 
(international) law, it has not yet been fully accepted as a binding principle of customary 
international law (Birnie et al., 2009). One might assume therefore that a precautionary approach 
would not be required. It is, however, found in many treaties aimed at preventing and addressing 
environmental harm including the Ozone Convention and Montreal Protocol (adopted before 
there was conclusive proof that the hole in the Ozone Layer was harmful to human health, or to 
other living organisms (Benedick, 2009)) the London Dumping Convention and its 1996 Protocol, 
and the 2001 POPs Convention (Sands & Peel 2012). What many of these treaties have in common 
is that they are addressing particularly harmful activities. One might ask then if the law requires a 
precautionary approach in such circumstances.  
We suggest that these conventions provide good models for the acceptance of a more 
precautionary approach within the Arctic in relation to oil and gas activities. Alternative sources 
of oil and gas can, for example, be found elsewhere in the world. Alternative sources of energy 
such as tide, wind and solar are also becoming more economically viable. Each of these points 
then to a reason to believe that a precautionary regime to address oil and gas extraction in the 
Arctic may be a success. The same logic underpinned the success of the Ozone Convention - 
alternative chemicals existed or could be developed quickly to replace those harming the ozone 
layer (Benedick, 2009: 24). There is further reason to anticipate success. The Arctic states adopted 
an Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, which 
adopts a precautionary approach by, in effect, placing a moratorium on high seas fishing in the 
Arctic for 16 years. In addition, and as noted earlier, the US and Canada adopted moratoria on 
future oil and gas licencing within much of their Arctic waters (all in Canada’s case). We argue that 
the same approach should be taken in respect of oil and gas activities. Adopting an Arctic Ocean 
wide moratorium on further activities (i.e., allowing existing exploitation to continue) would give 
time to conduct, for example, a thorough Strategic Impact Assessment at the Arctic Ocean level 
to better decide where such activities should take place. Given that offshore exploitation of oil and 
gas activities is already taking place in parts of the Arctic, and notwithstanding the Joint US- 
Canada “moratorium” it is likely that a moratorium on exploration and exploitation on the 
extended continental shelf and in areas beyond national jurisdiction would have a more realistic 
chance of success. Whether that would be sufficient to protect the Arctic Ocean from significant 
harm is, however, open to question. 
A precautionary approach could also be achieved in other ways. For example, the Arctic Council 
could further enhance its existing guidelines on offshore oil and gas activities to take a more 
precautionary approach, or the Arctic states could adopt a binding set of standards, perhaps 
brokered through the Arctic Council, which focus on a precautionary approach to offshore energy 
activities. These could prohibit all exploration and exploitation unless certain circumstances exist 
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or unless certain technical standards are met, in much the same way as the 1996 Protocol to the 
London Dumping Convention addresses dumping at sea. Which approach would be best in terms 
of environmental protection and in terms of being most likely to attract state compliance is a 
question for further research.    
Conclusions and Proposals 
Our discussion has shown that the potential for further oil and gas activities in the marine Arctic 
give rise to significant scientific and legal questions. These conclusions outline the questions that 
remain and while we note the important role played by the Arctic Council and other bodies in 
addressing existing gaps in knowledge and regulation, we do not here propose the location in 
which the answers to these questions should be developed: we simply set out the questions that 
remain.  
“Significant Harm” – Significant Questions 
We have demonstrated the need for further research to establish what “significant harm” looks 
like in the marine Arctic both in scientific and legal terms. In particular, we question whether the 
likely slower degradation and dispersal of, for example, oil in cold and, at times, ice covered waters 
may increase the impact of the pollutants on the Arctic ecosystem relative to temperate waters. 
Does, for example, the relative fragility of that ecosystem due to the relatively short food chain 
and the highly specialised nature of its species make it more vulnerable to pollution, thus turning 
what might be a minor pollution incident in temperate waters into a major incident in the Arctic? 
In addition we note that the interactions of pollutants with ice might also turn normally 
“insignificant” pollution into significant pollution through trapping pollutants in the ice, thus 
preventing dispersion and ultimately transporting pollutants as a single block to be deposited 
beyond the national jurisdiction of the state in which the emissions occur. These possibilities point 
to the need for better scientific understanding of the pollutant/ice interface and sea-ice drift 
patterns, as well as a need for better understanding of the role of the chain of causation in 
attributing harm under state responsibility.  These questions also raise the possibility that the 
actions required of coastal states to show that they have acted with due diligence may exceed those 
required in relevant international treaties particularly where those treaties apply globally and not 
only in the Arctic.  
The Challenges of EIA’s – Expanding the Evidence Base 
As noted earlier, states are obliged to conduct an EIA where major projects are proposed, but 
there is an urgent need to expand the Arctic scientific evidence base to ensure such EIAs are 
effective. First, more detailed baseline data on the Arctic marine environment are required if any 
such assessments are to be meaningful. Second, due to the rapidly changing environment in the 
Arctic, continuous monitoring of the Arctic marine environment is essential, in addition to 
monitoring of sites where development takes place. Without a coordinated, pan-Arctic monitoring 
programme, it will become increasingly difficulty to disentangle the direct impacts of human 
activity, for example oil and gas development, from background environmental change, 
particularly at cumulative impact scales. While Arctic wide monitoring is taking place through the 
Arctic Council Working Groups, we suggest that this programme should be built upon and 
expanded in scope, and should take a whole systems approach which places species and physical 
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processes within the wider context of a connected Arctic. This would enable those carrying out 
EIAs to better evaluate the effects of a development which may be felt across wider spatial and 
temporal scales, and provide states with a better means to predict transboundary impacts. 
International programmes such as the Multidisciplinary drifting Observatory for the Study of 
Arctic Climate (MOSAiC, www.mosaicobservatory.org) are beginning to provide such longer-term 
information.  However, while fundamental research around ocean processes, species, and the 
physical nature of the Arctic Ocean environment must continue to fill gaps in our basic 
understanding, we must also begin to apply these findings to the very real possibility of further 
industrial development in the Arctic, for example from oil and gas activities. This might take the 
form of a pan-Arctic Ocean Strategic Impact Assessment for petroleum activities. In doing so, we 
can move towards EIA processes in the Arctic, which are specific to the Arctic context, and in 
particular, which are better able to assess the cumulative impacts of development as it progresses, 
and transboundary effects occurring over time 
In addition further understanding is needed of the processes to adopt to ensure that Indigenous 
and local voices are effectively understood in EIA and other monitoring procedures. This raises 
questions for legal academics – what form of consultation or engagement is most effective in these 
circumstances? 
Clean-Up and Liability 
Finally, we raised a series of questions relating to clean-up and liability. Again we argue that further 
scientific research is needed into the possibility of and costs associated with cleaning up a pollution 
incident or cumulative pollution in the Arctic and into the feasibility of extending the existing 
Fund Convention or adopting a convention similar to it or to the provisions of Annex VI to the 
Anarctic Treaty environmental protocol to apply to Arctic offshore oil and gas activities. As we 
noted, further understanding is also needed in legal terms of how states can prove or mount a 
defence against questions of liability for transboundary environmental harm.  
The Need for Cooperation and a Precautionary Approach 
We argue that cumulatively these questions point to two things: the need for further cooperation 
between Arctic states and the need for a precautionary approach to further oil and gas activities in 
the Arctic.  We suggested a number of models to adopt to address the need for further cooperation 
and the need for a precautionary approach. The questions that these possible approaches raise are 
focussed on the legal requirements to take further steps to cooperate, the legal requirement to 
adopt a precautionary approach and the question of what an agreement to establish an oil and gas 
moratorium, or “precautionary standards” might look like. 
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Notes 
1. All Arctic states with the exception of the United States of America are party to the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS.) For its part, the USA accepts most of the 
provisions of UNCLOS as representing customary international law. 
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